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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

23 April 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Mr. Allan Evans. State (INR)

(DIA)

Chief,

Policy Staff. NSA

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SUBJECT

Memorandum to Holders of SNIE 30-2-63: THE ADVANCED WEAPONS PROGRAMS OF THE UAR

AND ISRAEL

- 1. We have received from the White House a request that the USIB review the above SNIE and determine whether its conclusions remain valid or require modification. The findings are needed on an urgent basis, and we propose to meet this requirement by a Memorandum to Holders of the estimate, to be considered by the USIB on 29 April.
- 2. The attached memorandum on this subject has been prepared in CIA. It is requested that your representatives meet with us at 1400, Monday, 27 April, at CIA Headquarters, to discuss this draft. Copies of this draft are being sent to JAEIC and GMAIC, with a request that they consider the question on an urgent basis, and make known to all concerned their views on these judgments before the paper is considered by the USIB representatives.

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Executive Officer National Estimates

cc: Colonel Ernest vonPawel, USA (ACSI)

Captain A. W. Long, USN (ONI)

Colonel C. D. Fisher, USAF (AFNIEBB)

Chairman, JAEIC Chairman, GMAIC

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GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AGENCY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

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MEMORANDUM TO HOLDERS OF SNIE 30-2-63: THE ADVANCED SUBJECT: WEAPONS PROGRAMS OF THE UAR AND ISRAEL, DATED 8 MAY 1963

1. The Israeli nuclear energy program appears to be presently confined to research, but it could be adapted to a weapons development program. We believe that the Israelis had not by January, 1964 started the chemical separation plant that would be needed to produce the fissionable material for a nuclear explosion. Since SNIE 30-2-63 was written, the Israelis have signed the nuclear

test ban treaty.	
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SNIE 30-2-63 said "Indeed, we believe the Israelis, unless deterred by cutside pressure, will attempt to produce a weapon sometime in the next several years." Since May, 1963, the deterrents have increased and the chances of Israel's undertaking a nuclear weapons program have diminished, although we are not prepared to say they will probably not do so.

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3. We believe taht the other conclusions of SNIE 30-2-63 remain generally valid.

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